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Abstract
To which extent do firms insulate their workers’ wages from fluc-
tuations in product markets? Which firm and worker attributes are
associated with wage flexibility at the micro level? We first rely on
Guiso et al. (2005) to estimate dynamic models of sales and wages,
finding that in Portugal workers’ wages respond to permanent shocks
to firm performance, as opposed to transitory shocks. We then ex-
plore the factors associated with wage flexibility, finding that collec-
tive bargaining and minimum wages are associated with higher wage
insurance by the firm, while the threat of firm bankruptcy reduces
it. Managers receive less protection against permanent shocks than
other workers.
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I. Introduction
The impact of high wage flexibility reducing economic fluctuations and improv-
ing macroeconomic performance has been highlighted in the literature, where
wage flexibility has invariably been evaluated as the responsiveness of wages to
aggregate conditions, namely the unemployment rate. However, in the termi-
nology of Faggio and Nickell (2005), wage flexibility has two different aspects:
the responsiveness of wages to labor market conditions, and the responsiveness
of wages within a firm to idiosyncratic shocks to its productivity or its output.
They concentrate on the first aspect. The second aspect can be understood as
the micro foundations for wage flexibility, the issue under analysis in the current
study. We focus on Portugal, pointed out as one of the OECD economies with
highest wage flexibility, despite its labor market regulations.
More precisely, we will provide an answer to the questions: What is the
responsiveness of wages to shocks to firm output? I.e., to which extent do
firms provide wage insurance to their workers, insulating them from fluctuations
in product markets? Which firm and worker attributes are associated with a
higher degree of wage flexibility at the firm level? A very precise hypothesis
has been stated by Faggio and Nickell (2005): national collective bargaining is
associated with lower responsiveness of wages to labor market conditions. We
will check whether workers covered by national bargaining agreements also see
their wages react less to firm level idiosyncratic shocks than workers covered by
more decentralized agreements. At first sight that might be expected, but it is
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not necessarily the case. Indeed, Teulings (1997) has argued that in a corporatist
setting for wage bargaining, firms can delegate on trade unions the task of
adjusting contracts to macro level shocks, while then promoting adjustments to
firm idiosyncratic shocks. Also, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) have shown that
firms are able to overcome the constraints imposed by collective bargaining
by adjusting the actual wage paid on top of the bargained wage. We will also
inspect the impact of other labor market regulations, namely the minimum wage,
on wage flexibility. Other hypotheses can be derived from the wage insurance
literature, which has shown that the share of risk borne by the firm and the
worker depends on factors such as: the persistence of the shocks hitting the
firm; workers’ and firms’ preferences, namely their degree of risk-aversion; the
sensitivity of firm output to worker effort; the likelihood of bankruptcy.
An empirical test on such theories depends crucially on the quality and de-
tail of the data available. We use a longitudinal matched employer-employee
dataset of remarkable quality, which matches all the firms and workers in the
manufacturing and services private sectors. Given its nature, problems com-
monly faced by longitudinal data sets, such as panel attrition and under- or
over-representation of certain groups, are avoided. Also, the legal requirement
for the data to be posted in a visible location within the company contributes
to its reliability, reducing measurement errors.
Guiso et al. (2005) have devised an empirical strategy to quantify the im-
pact of temporary and permanent firm-level shocks on wages, which relies on
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longitudinal matched employer-employee data to estimate dynamic panel data
models. We will follow their strategy to quantify the wage response to firm-
level permanent and transitory shocks. We will then explore the forces that
shape wage flexibility at the firm level, in particular the role of the institutional
setting.
After the brief revision of the literature that follows, section III describes the
institutional framework for wage setting in Portugal and section IV describes
the data. Sections V to VIII summarize the empirical model and present the
results, before concluding comments are presented in section IX.
II. Wage insurance in the previous literature
Insurance models can explain why wages do not adjust as much as predicted
by spot market theory, after changes in the demand for the firm output. The
underlying idea is that firms, being risk neutral, commit to paying a pre-defined
wage to their risk averse workers, independently of product market fluctuations.
Such strategy is profit maximizing because risk-averse workers will accept a
non-stochastic wage lower than the expected value of a stochastic wage. Early
models have been developed by Baily (1974), Gordon (1974), and Azariadis
(1975). Other models predict relatively smaller insurance provision. Gamber
(1988) allows for firm bankruptcy, which constrains the capacity of the firm
to provide insurance to the workers, and distinguishes between temporary and
permanent shocks, in a two-period model. In his model, real wages react more
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to permanent shocks than to temporary ones. In case of temporary shocks,
the firm wishing to smooth the wage of the worker over time can promote a
relatively small wage adjustment in the period the shock occurs, deferring the
rest of the adjustment to the following period.
A central issue that follows concerns the enforceability of insurance contracts.
For example, if worker performance is not verifiable, the firm may gain from
declaring that it is below its actual level and reneging the contract, thus paying
a wage lower than the insurance wage. Similarly, if worker mobility is allowed,
the worker might gain from reneging the contract and accepting a better outside
offer. Implicit contract theory has established conditions under which it is in the
firm’s and in the worker’s interest to stick to the contract. Basically, workers and
firms will respect the contract as long as its long run gains outweigh the short
term benefit from reneging it. The insurance wage could therefore fluctuate
between the level strictly required to prevent the firm from dismissing the worker
and, by a similar reasoning, the level strictly required to prevent the worker from
quitting. The latter case holds when contracts are not binding on the worker,
whereas the former holds when contracts are not binding on the firm.1
Empirical studies relied initially on aggregate industry data (Gamber 1988,
1For an early overview of contract theory, see Rosen (1985). Weiss (1984) has
considered the role of mobility costs preventing workers from quitting and thus
enabling firms to provide wage insurance; Holmstrom (1981) and Thomas and
Worrall (1988) model the consequences of the loss of reputation by firms that
renege on a contract; in the model by Harris and Holmstrom (1982), firms learn
about worker ability and adjust the wage to the outside market to prevent the
worker from quitting.
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Christofides and Oswald 1992, Blanchflower et al. 1996), progressing to use
firm-level averages (Hildreth and Oswald 1997, Nickell and Wadhwani 1990).
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) use individual worker data, but their indicator
of market conditions is computed at the aggregate or industry level. Similarly,
Weinberg (2001) uses individual data, but relies on a measure of shocks defined
at the industry level, to analyze wage and employment fluctuations at the indus-
try level in response to demand shocks. Devereux (2005) relies on panel data on
workers to quantify the impact of industry-level demand shocks on wages, find-
ing that industry wages respond positively to changes in industry employment.
Faggio and Nickel (2005) use worker longitudinal data to quantify the impact
of changes in labor market conditions at the regional level on wages. Finally,
Guiso et al. (2005) have set a new benchmark in the analysis of this issue.
The ingenious empirical identification strategy followed relies on longitudinal
matched employer-employee data to estimate dynamic panel data models and
quantify the impact of temporary and permanent firm-level shocks on wages.
They found that firms provide full insurance against temporary shocks, while
providing only partial insurance against permanent shocks.
The literature on wage insurance is linked to that on rent sharing, having in
particular a common aim: to check the relationship wages - profits (or another
indicator of performance). In one case it is highlighted that firm and workers
share risks and in the other case it is highlighted that they share rents. The
theoretical background is different, though. The wage insurance literature, rely-
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ing mostly on implicit contracts theory, highlights: the individual nature of the
contract signed between the firm and the worker, as opposed to the emphasis on
the firm and union nature of bargaining; the differential risk aversion by workers
and firms; demand shocks at the micro level that translate into idiosyncratic
shocks to firm performance (given its idiosyncratic nature, not affecting the
whole market, they are the type of risk that the firm can reduce by diversifica-
tion). In the wage insurance setting, distortions to competitive mechanism are
brought about mainly by incomplete credit and insurance markets. In the rent
sharing literature, distortions to competitive mechanism are most often seen as
a result of worker bargaining power and, less often, as stemming from efficiency
wage considerations or frictions in the labor market.
A broader setting would consider jointly the occurrence of different levels of
shocks to firm performance (aggregate, industry and firm level shocks), disen-
tangling whether workers are insulated from each of those types of shocks and,
if so, by which mechanisms: national legislation on worker protection, union
action through collective bargaining contracts, or firm level policies. Such anal-
ysis could in particular address one issue not handled in the settings described.
Indeed, wages may be independent of firm performance for two different rea-
sons: either because the labor market is competitive and wages do not depend
on idiosyncratic firm shocks, as they are set by aggregate conditions, or, in situ-
ations where wages are bargained over, because firms offer insurance. Below we
will concentrate only on firm idiosyncratic shocks, distinguishing between their
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temporary or permanent nature to evaluate their impact on workers wages.
III. Wage setting institutions in Portugal
The Portuguese labor market is characterized by a high level of employment
rigidity and high wage flexibility. In fact, its strict job protection legislation,
covering issues such as advance notice required before dismissal, severance pay,
and the rules on use of fixed-term or temporary contracts, invariably place the
country among the OECD economies with highest employment rigidity (see for
example OECD 1999). On the contrary, it ranks among the OECD economies
with highest wage flexibility (see OECD 1992), since wages are highly responsive
to the unemployment rate, despite the regulated framework.
Even though union membership has declined, from 61 percent in 1970 and
1980 to 32 percent in 1990 (OECD 1994: 184), collective bargaining covers
almost all of the workforce. This wide coverage results from widespread mech-
anisms of extension of contracts: most often, employers who subscribe to an
agreement apply it to all of their workforce, irrespective of the worker union
membership status; employers or workers representatives can join an existing
agreement, subscribing to a contract they had initially not signed; moreover,
the Government can impose mandatory extensions of existing contracts, when
workers are not covered by a trade union, when one of the parties refuses to
negotiate or negotiation is obstructed in any other way. As a rule, wage ne-
gotiations are held yearly and the wage updates take effect in January each
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year.
Studies at the micro level have identified sources of wage flexibility under this
regulated setting. In particular, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) have found that
wages set by collective bargaining reflect to a high extent the degree of power
of the partners negotiating, but subsequent firm-specific arrangements reduce
the returns to union power, adjusting wages to the conditions that prevail at
the micro level. Also, Cardoso (1999) had found that the returns to different
worker attributes vary widely across firms.
Note therefore that both the theoretical underpinnings of wage insurance and
empirical evidence highlight the firm as a relevant level of analysis to discuss
the protection of workers’ wages against market fluctuations.
IV. Data set
Quadros de Pessoal is a matched employer-employee data set gathered by the
Ministry of Employment, based on an inquiry that every company with wage-
earners is legally obliged to fill in. Public administration and domestic service
are not covered, and the coverage of agriculture is low, given its low share of
wage-earners. For the remaining sectors, the mandatory nature of the survey
leads to an extremely high response rate. Each year, around two million workers
and 100 to 200 thousand companies are covered. Data for 1991 to 2000 are used.
Reported data cover the firm and all the workers engaged in the firm in a ref-
erence week (whether wage-earner, unpaid family member or owner working in
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the firm). Reported variables include the firm’s location, industry, employment,
sales volume, ownership structure, and date of creation, and the worker’s gen-
der, schooling, age, occupation, seniority, several components of wage, duration
of work, and collective bargaining contract.
A worker identification code, based on a transformation of the social secu-
rity number, enables tracking him/her over time. Extensive checks have been
performed to guarantee the accuracy of the data, using gender, date of birth,
and highest schooling level achieved. A firm identification code enables track-
ing it over time. Based in particular on the location of the firm and its official
identification codes, extensive controls are implemented by the data gathering
agency to guarantee that a firm is not assigned a different number later on.
Details on the construction of the database, sample sizes, and descriptive
statistics are presented in appendix.
V. Firm performance
We start by briefly describing the intuition behind the procedure in Guiso et al.
(2005), which we will follow. First, consistent estimates of the residuals from
a wage regression are retrieved; similarly, consistent estimates of the residuals
from a regression of firm performance are retrieved. Given the set of controls
included in each of these regressions, the residuals capture idiosyncratic shocks
to workers wages and to firm performance. Then, we make use of both residu-
als and regress idiosyncratic shocks to wages on idiosyncratic shocks to firm’s
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performance, evaluating the level of insurance provided by the firm to both tem-
porary and permanent shocks. Finally, we check for heterogeneity in the degree
of wage insurance provided, according to firm and worker attributes.
What accomplishments does this empirical method bring relative to less
complex methods previously used in the literature? Mainly, it enables analyzing
the provision of wage insurance at the firm level (against idiosyncratic shocks),
distinguishing moreover between the impact of shocks with different degrees of
persistence (temporary versus permanent).
Based on the specification used by Guiso et al. (2005), firms’ performance
is modeled as
salesjt = γt + ρsalesj,t−1 +X
′
jtΓ + ηj + jt (1)
where salesjt is the logarithm of sales of firm j in period t, Xjt is a vector of
firm characteristics that includes a set of industry and location dummies, γt
represents period t specific constant, ρ and Γ are parameters to be estimated,
ηj is the firm specific effect, and jt is the remaining component of the error
term.
A major issue concerns the empirical measurement of fluctuations in prod-
uct markets. The shock affecting the firm has been defined using: the industry
output price (Gamber 1988) (Christofides and Oswald 1992); the industry profit
(Blanchflower et al. 1996) (Christofides and Oswald 1992); firm profits, in stud-
ies that rely however on wage data also aggregated for the firm level (Hildreth
and Oswald 1997) (Nickell and Wadhwani 1990). Abowd and Lemieux (1993)
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rely on a set of assumptions to compute firm-level quasi-rents per worker (av-
erage value added per worker evaluated at the workers’ alternative wage), and
use the price of exports and imports at the industry level to instrument it. In a
similar vein, Abowd and Allain (1996) compute firm-level quasi-rents, but allow
their impact on wages to vary depending on the size of the rents and on industry
product market conditions. Kramarz (2003) also uses US manufacturing export
prices to instrument firm-level quasi-rents, further allowing firm-level imports
to have a direct impact on wages (justified by their influence on worker and
firm bargaining powers). Guiso et al. (2005) use value added, arguing that it is
the variable directly subject to stochastic fluctuations, being more reliable than
profits. A similar option was taken by Esteva˜o and Tevlin (2003), who nev-
ertheless used industry data. Holzer and Montgomery (1993) used firm sales,
with wages averaged for the firm level. We use sales as our indicator of firm
performance, arguing that it captures demand uncertainty, as shocks in product
demand are directly reflected in changes in sales. Given fluctuations in demand,
output could remain unchanged if prices would adjust fully and instantaneously,
but since that is not the case, output will undergo fluctuations (Baily 1974).
Sales were deflated using the GDP deflator.
Estimation of equation (1) by OLS or the usual panel models, fixed or ran-
dom effects, is inconsistent in the presence of the lagged dependent variable,
since, by definition, salesj,t−1 is correlated with ηj . We follow Arellano and
Bond (1991), taking first differences to eliminate the fixed effect, and then esti-
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mating equation (1) using a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure.
The set of instruments include salesj,t−3 and earlier levels of this variable. The
remaining regressors are treated as exogenous, and introduced in levels as in-
struments. The results for the 1–step GMM estimation procedure are reported
in Table 1.
The use of this method calls for some discussion. This solution has poor finite
sample properties concerning bias and precision when the available instruments
are weak. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the solution of Arellano and
Bond (1991) has a large downward bias when the time series are persistent and
the number of periods is small, and argue for the implementation of a system
GMM estimation, for first-differences and levels. In our case, this solution is
not feasible given the structure of the error component jt assumed later on.2
The persistence of sales over time is represented by a coefficient on lagged
sales of .47. Our results indicate that industry dummies are jointly significant,
just like time dummies and region dummies. According to the Sargan test, we
do not reject the validity of our instruments at the 1% and 5% levels. The serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals indicates that we should be using
lagged levels of sales dated t− 3 and earlier, as we do.
In Table 2 we report the autocovariance structure for ∆jt. The results
confirm our choice of instruments. After 2 lags the covariance of first-differenced
2In Section 7 we define jt = ζjt+ν˜jt−θν˜j,t−1 and ζjt = ζj,t−1+u˜jt, which im-
plies that Cov(jt,∆j,t−τ ) 6= 0. This renders infeasible the implementation of
the system GMM estimation. We thank Rob Alessie for the thorough discussion
on the estimation alternatives.
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Table 1: Sales regression
Variable Estimate
Log sales at t-1 .47 (.022)
Region dummies 8.53 [.074]
Industry dummies 72.54 [.000]
Year dummies 151.30 [.000]
Sargan 37.10 [.093]
Sargan-df 27.00
AR(1) -21.41 [.000]
AR(2) 5.24 [.000]
AR(3) .72 [.473]
AR(4) -.83 [.405]
AR(5) -.15 [.879]
AR(6) .67 [.506]
AR(7) -.67 [.501]
Observations 94365
Firms 17097
The regression has been estimated by the first-
differenced GMM procedure discussed in Arel-
lano and Bond (1991). The instruments are
discussed in the text. The dependent vari-
able is log real sales. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses; p-values in brack-
ets. For region, industry and year dummies,
the joint F − statistic is reported. Sargan-df
stands for the degrees of freedom of the Sargan
test. AR shows the test for serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals.
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Table 2: Firms’ autocovariances
τ E(∆jt,∆j,t−τ ) Standard error
0 .7795 .0151
1 -.3096 .0080
2 -.0653 .0103
3 .0031 .0076
4 .0083 .0073
5 -.0051 .0070
6 -.0020 .0067
7 -.0009 .0067
The autocovariances are computed us-
ing all years pooled.
residuals is statistically insignificant. These results are of particular interest for
the specification of the structure of the error term which will take place in
Section 7.
VI. Worker earnings
Workers’ wages are specified as
wageijt = K
′
ijtΦ + ϕi + αPjt + βTjt + ψijt (2)
where wageijt stands for the logarithm of monthly wage of worker i engaged
in firm j in period t, and K includes industry, region and year dummies, as
well as age and age squared. The first component of the error term is the
worker specific effect, ϕi. Following Guiso et al. (2005), we include in the wage
regression the permanent and transitory components of firm specific shock, Pjt
and Tjt, respectively, to be further explained in section 7. The parameters α and
β capture the impact of these shocks on wages. Finally, ψijt is the remaining
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Table 3: Wage regression
Variable Estimate
Log wage at t-1 .69 (0.083)
Region dummies 13.11 [.108]
Industry dummies 24.54 [.220]
Year dummies 126.50 [.000]
Sargan 27.53 [.121]
Sargan-df 20.00
AR(1) -10.85 [.000]
AR(2) 5.18 [.000]
AR(3) -1.84 [.066]
AR(4) 1.75 [.081]
AR(5) -.65 [.515]
AR(6) .61 [.544]
AR(7) -1.21 [.223]
Observations 98655
Individuals 30657
The dependent variable is log real monthly
wage. See the note to Table 1.
component of the error term not captured by the worker specific effect or the
firm specificities.
To replicate Guiso et al.’s (2005) strategy to identify α and β we multiply
equation (2) by (1− ρL), where L is the lag operator. The transformed wage
equation is defined as
wageijt = ρwageij,t−1 + (1− ρL)K ′ijtΦ + (1− ρL)(ϕi +αPjt +βTjt +ψijt) (3)
The direct implication is that we introduce state dependence on wages in the
equation to be estimated. The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the
right hand side as a result of this transformation brings about an endogeneity
problem. In order to solve this issue, and as in the case of equation (1), we
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Table 4: Workers’ autocovariances
τ E(∆ωjt,∆ωj,t−τ ) Standard error
0 .0536 .0012
1 -.0253 .0008
2 -.0034 .0009
3 -.0009 .0007
4 .0005 .0006
5 -.0001 .0008
6 .0010 .0010
7 -.0017 .0014
The autocovariances are computed us-
ing all years pooled. ∆ωijt is the first-
differenced composite residual from
equation (2).
use Arellano and Bond first-differenced GMM procedure to obtain consistent
estimates.
In the current section we concentrate on estimation and analysis of the first-
differenced composite error term ∆ωijt associated with the transformed wage
equation, and delay to section 7 further analysis of the different components.3
We use levels of wage lagged 4 periods and earlier as instruments for first-
differenced equations. The remaining regressors are assumed exogenous and
introduced in levels. The results for the 1–step first-differenced GMM estimation
are reported in Table 3.4
The coefficient on lagged wage is .69, indicating higher persistence than for
sales. Industry dummies are not jointly significant, while region dummies are
3After we transform equation (2), the composite error term is defined as
ωijt = (1− ρL)(ϕi + αPjt + βTjt + ψijt).
4We have considered each employment spell as a pair worker-firm, since we
are interested in the provision of wage insurance by a given firm, and not the
overall insurance the worker may enjoy when switching firms.
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marginally insignificant at the 10% level. The test for overidentifying restrictions
does not reject our instruments. Table 4 reports the covariance structure of
first-differenced residuals associated with equation (2), ∆ωijt. First-differencing
implies that ∆ωijt lacks ϕi, i.e. it is defined only as a function of the remaining
three components of the error term in equation (2). The results support our
choice of instruments in Table 3.
VII. Insurance provision by the firm
To quantify the insurance provided by firms to their workers we need first to
estimate the sensitivity parameters, α and β, and then to estimate the different
variance components of the error terms associated with equations (1) and (2).
Throughout the section, we borrow the formulation and estimation strategy
proposed by Guiso et al. (2005), adjusting for the specificities of our analysis.
The main findings are reported in Table 5.
We start by showing in Panel A the covariance structures in the matched
sample of firms and workers, which contains 71585 observations. The first two
columns report results similar to those shown in Tables 2 and 4. The last column
shows that the covariance between the worker’s and the firm’s lagged shocks is
positive and significant, which is a first indication that firms do not provide full
insurance to their workers.
To assess insurance within the firm we now focus our attention on the relation
between changes in workers’ residuals, ∆ωijt, and changes in the firms’ residuals,
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Table 5: Testing for insurance
A. Covariances
τ E(∆ωjt,∆ωj,t−τ ) E(∆jt,∆j,t−τ ) E(∆ωjt,∆j,t−τ )
0 .0545 .7174 -.0012
(.0014) (.0265) (.0010)
1 -.0256 -.2912 .0035
(.0009) (.0143) (.0010)
B. Sensitivity to permanent and transitory shocks
Permanent shock Transitory shock
Sensitivity .0924 -.0011
(.0446) (.0019)
Observations 25667 55077
J-test [.5405] [.1919]
F-test [.0019] [.0000]
Exogeneity test [.0422]
C. Variance components and insurance coverage
Firm Worker
σ2u˜ .1325 σ
2
ξ .0168
(.0203) (.0058)
σ2v˜ .3667 σ
2
µ .0058
(.0323) (.0113)
θ -.1775 λ -.2155
(.0394) (.0281)
Ratio .3004
The covariances are computed for the matched sample, and using all years pooled. The
estimation procedure and instruments used in part B are explained in the text. The
F − test refers to the first-stage regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses;
p-values in brackets. The ratio is defined in the text.
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∆jt. Firms’ error term, jt, is formulated as the sum of two components: a
random walk and a MA(1), such that jt = ζjt + ν˜jt − θν˜j,t−1, where ζjt =
ζj,t−1 + u˜jt. By assuming that E(u˜2jt) = σ
2
u˜, E(ν˜
2
jt) = σ
2
ν˜ for all t, E(ν˜jsν˜jt) =
E(u˜jsu˜jt) = 0 for s 6= t, and E(ν˜jsu˜jt) = 0 for all s and t, we expect that after
two periods the autocovariance of ∆jt goes to zero. Empirically, Table 2 gives
support to this specification, since we observe that autocovariances are zero for
lags above 2, and non-zero for two or less lags.
The permanent and transitory shocks, Pjt and Tjt, respectively, included
in equation (2) can now be defined. By modeling firms’ residual jt as defined
above, we allow for both permanent and transitory shocks on firms’ performance.
Rewriting equation (1) allows us to formulate
salesjt = (1− ρL)−1
(
γt +X ′jtΓ + ηj
)
+ (1− ρL)−1 jt. The first element on
the right hand side of this equation represents a deterministic component, while
the second element is (1− ρL)−1 jt = Pjt+Tjt. As derived by Guiso et al., the
following expressions model the two shock components: Pjt = (1− ρL)−1 ζjt
and Tjt = (1− ρL)−1
(
(1− θL) v˜jt − (1− ρ)−1 ρu˜jt
)
.
Although our results on autocovariances for ∆jt are not too different from
Guiso et al. and support the structure adopted for the error term jt, our find-
ings for the autocovariances of ∆ωijt, Table 4, do not match theirs. Particularly,
they find evidence consistent with a MA(3) process for ∆ωijt, while our results
indicate that the covariances of ∆ωijt are not statistically different from zero
after 2 periods. However, the results we report in Table 3 indicate that (i)
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the first-differenced residuals in the wage regression can be correlated 3 periods
apart, and (ii) the use of levels of wages lagged 4 periods and earlier as instru-
ments is validated by the Sargan overidentification test. Combining these pieces
of evidence, we follow Guiso et al., and define the last component of the error
term in equation (2) as ψijt = ϑijt + ξijt − λξij,t−1, with ϑijt = ϑij,t−1 + µijt.
At the core of the estimation strategy lies an instrumental variables regres-
sion, whose specific instruments allow for the identification of the parameters
of interest, i.e. α, the sensitivity of wages to permanent shocks, and β, the sen-
sitivity of wages to transitory shocks. In both cases, the dependent variable is
∆ωijt, and the explanatory variable is ∆jt. Consistent estimates of these vari-
ables are obtained from sales and wage regressions presented in Tables 1 and 3,
respectively. Guiso et al. (2005) show that (
∑2
τ=−2 ∆j,t+τ )
k, with k ≥ 1, is a
valid set of instruments to estimate α, while the estimation of β can be based
on the instruments (∆j,t+1)m, with m ≥ 1.
To estimate both α and β we have used the feasible efficient GMM procedure,
controlling for error correlation within firms.5 In each regression the specific in-
struments are defined for k=m=1,..,9. For both regressions, a likelihood-ratio
5In the permanent shock regression we clearly reject the null hypothesis of
homoscedastic error terms, which justifies the use of GMM. For example, the
Pagan and Hall test discussed in Baum et al. (2003) has a p-value of .0148.
For the transitory shock the evidence on heteroscedasticity is mixed. However,
since our sample is large enough for asymptotic results to be valid, and given
that IV gives inconsistent inference results if errors are in fact heteroscedastic,
we adopted a conservative strategy and implemented the GMM procedure also
in this case. The following conclusions on transitory shocks are not changed if
we use generalized IV instead of GMM.
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test rejects the null that the extra powers of the instruments are redundant.6
The overidentifying restriction tests do not reject the validity of instruments
used in both regressions, and from the F − test we conclude that the instru-
ments used in each regression are jointly significant. Finally, we performed the
exogeneity test for ∆jt based on the difference in the Hansen-Sargan statistic
between a model where it is assumed exogenous and our alternative model where
we take it as endogenous. The test rejects the null that ∆jt is exogenous. This
result implies that we also reject the equality between the sensitivity to both
types of shocks, in line with Guiso et al. (2005).
We conclude from Panel B that workers’ wages are not sensitive to transitory
shocks on firms’ performance, but they respond to firms’ permanent shocks. The
elasticity of wages to permanent shocks to firms’ performance is .09 (compared
to .07 in Guiso et al. (2005) for Italy).
Following the evidence provided by Altonji and Segal (1996), we estimated
the different variance components using equally weighted minimum distance.
Panel C reports the results. We can define the two variances associated with
the shocks to sales as σ2u = σ2u˜/(1−ρ)2 and σ2v = (1+θ2)σ2v˜ +(ρ/(1−ρ))2σ2u˜. These
are the variances of the permanent shock and the transitory shock, respectively.
We estimate that σ2u is .477, and σ
2
v is .485, which amounts to a considerable
variability. The moving average coefficient is about -.18. All three estimates
are statistically significant. For workers the variance of transitory shocks, σ2ξ ,
6The p-value of the tests is always below .001.
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is .0168, while the variance of permanent shocks, σ2µ, is approximately .01, but
statistically insignificant. The moving average parameter estimate is -.22, and
significant. These results are consistent with our analysis from Panel B. Our
results also show that the different variances are considerably higher for firms
than for workers. All of our estimated variances are considerably larger than the
ones found for Italy by Guiso et al., just like the absolute value of the moving
averages parameters. This can possibly reflect the higher wage flexibility in the
Portuguese labor market.
To compute the portion of wage variability that can be attributed to firm’s
shock, the ratio
√
E
{[
(∆ωijt)
2
]
|j
}
/
√
E
[
(∆ωijt)
2
]
is defined. We conclude that
approximately 30% of the total variability in wages can be explained by firm-
specific risk. For the Italian labor market, Guiso et al. conclude that this
ratio is about 15%. Combining the evidence gathered so far, we conclude that
Portuguese firms provide less insurance to their workers, when compared to
Italian firms, a result in line with the high wage flexibility pointed out by studies
on Portugal.
VIII. Forces shaping wage flexibility at the firm
level
We now turn to the analysis of heterogeneity in insurance provision by firms. We
consider different factors identified in the theoretical literature as shaping wage
flexibility at the firm level. First of all, firms may be subject to institutional con-
straints. As argued by Faggio and Nickell (2005), national pay bargaining may
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insulate wages from firm idiosyncratic shocks. A similar role can be played by
the minimum wage legislation, since firms with a large share of their workforce
on minimum wage will have part of their wage policy set by the Government
based on nation-wide trends. Firms that operate in more than one industry or
region may be more able to diversify risk. On the contrary, a higher risk of
going bankrupt will reduce the firm possibility to provide wage insurance. We
consider also the occupation of the worker, with a dummy variable for managers
meant to proxy two factors: the sensitivity of firm output to worker effort, with
the wages of crucial workers more closely linked to firm performance, and there-
fore subject to less insurance provision; the capacity of the worker to bear risk,
with managers likely to have more wealth and more access to financial markets
where to diversify risk, and larger expertise in financial issues. The possibility
of monitoring output has been pointed out as another factor that reduces the
degree of insurance provided by the firm. Indeed, if the firm could monitor
exactly the effort of the worker, it would not need to engage in a wage contract.
Higher precision of the signal on the agent’s effort will lead to less insurance
(Guiso et al. (2005) have computed the noise on performance as the variability
over time in the performance of the firm).
The results are reported in table 6, where Manager is a dummy variable
equal to one if he worker is a manager and Decent. barg. equals one if the worker
is covered by firm-level bargaining, as opposed to a massive collective bargaining
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agreement.7 Bankruptcy is the threat of bankruptcy8, NInd is the number of
industries in which the firm operates, and NEst its number of establishments,
FSize stands for (log of) firm employment, and Foreign is a dummy variable
for the foreign origin of the capital; SDsales represents the volatility of firm
sales9, and Shareminw is the share of workers in the firm earning the national
minimum wage.
To estimate these regressions we implemented once again the GMM proce-
dure used in Panel B of Table 5, and define the extra instruments as the previous
instruments interacted with the new variables. The validity of the instruments
used is not rejected in both regressions. Since we have multiple endogenous
regressors, Shea’s (1997) partial R2 are reported.
Results indicate that firms with a larger share of their workforce earning the
minimum wage are less able to translate permanent shocks in product demand
into wage changes. Indeed, the minimum wage is set at the national level by
Government regulation, taking into explicit account aggregate trends such as
the overall economy inflation rate. However, when faced with transitory shocks,
firms with different shares of minimum wage workers do not react differently in
terms of wage insurance. The level at which collective bargaining takes place
also has an impact on the degree of insurance provided by the firm when faced
7Worker covered by a firm-level agreement or collective bargaining agreement
(which involves a restricted group of firms, not organized into an employer
association), as opposed to collective bargaining contracts, which often cover a
whole industry, or the mandatory regime imposed by the Government.
8The percentage of firms that go bankrupt in a given year and detailed region.
9Measured by the standard deviation of logarithm of sales for the years under
analysis.
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Table 6: Insurance heterogeneity
Permanent shock Transitory shock
∆jt -.1628 -.0506
(.1016) (.0076)
[.0281] [.3192]
∆jt ∗Manager .0194 -.0039
(.0054) (.0029)
[.0157] [.4370]
∆jt ∗ SDSales -.0078 .0023
(.0081) (.0013)
[.0990] [.4230]
∆jt ∗Bankruptcy .0215 .0021
(.0110) (.0004)
[.0298] [.3736]
∆jt ∗ Foreign .0149 .0124
(.0239) (.0023)
[.0380] [.4229]
∆jt ∗ FSize -.0050 .0018
(.0081) (.0012)
[.0486] [.3717]
∆jt ∗NInd .0101 .0063
(.0245) (.0041)
[.0289] [.4130]
∆jt ∗ Shareminw -.0380 .0095
(.0229) (.0410)
[.3266] [.1754]
∆jt ∗Decent.barg. -.0017 .0171
(.0298) (.0030)
[.0357] [.5210]
Observations 25604 54873
J-test: p− value .4309 .5447
The dependent variable is ∆ωijt. The instruments used in each re-
gression are explained in the text. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses; Shea’s (1997) partial R2 in brackets. We account for
within firm correlation of residuals. We report the J-test for the va-
lidity of the instruments.
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with transitory shocks. More decentralized bargaining regimes are associated
with less insurance, as opposed to massive collective wage setting agreements,
which constraint the capacity of the firm to reflect demand shocks on wage
changes.
Managers are less insured against permanent shocks than the rest of the
workforce. This could be due to the fact that they may receive performance pay
that links wages directly to the results of the company. Moreover, managers
can be expected to be less risk-averse than other workers and as such would not
have to be given the same level of insurance to exert effort. However, managers
and workers with other occupations receive equal protection against transitory
shocks.
Firms with a higher threat of bankruptcy are, as expected, less able to pro-
vide wage insurance and more constrained to reflect changes in product markets
into changes in wages. That holds both for transitory and permanent shocks.
Firms with higher variability in their sales offer less insurance against transitory
changes in their performance. When faced with higher uncertainty in product
markets, firms are bound to reflect more of the change in sales on wages, in the
short-run. Foreign firms provide less insurance to transitory shocks.
IX. Conclusion
The impact of product market uncertainty on workers wages has been evaluated,
relying on data of remarkable quality to estimate dynamic panel data models.
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Results point to the rejection of the full insurance hypothesis. Workers’ wages
respond to permanent shocks to firm performance, whereas they are not sensitive
to transitory shocks. In comparison to Italy, Portuguese firms provide less
insurance to their workers. The higher responsiveness of wages to shocks at
the firm level corroborates evidence previously reported on the high degree of
wage flexibility in Portugal, when evaluated as the responsiveness of wages to
macroeconomic conditions.
Another aim of the analysis was to check the impact of labor market regu-
lations on the extent to which firms translate idiosyncratic shocks in product
markets into shocks to the wages paid. We found that the national minimum
wage and collective bargaining are indeed associated with the extent of wage
insurance provided by the firm. Firms with a larger share of their workforce
earning the minimum wage are less able to translate permanent shocks in prod-
uct demand into wage changes. Also, massive collective wage setting agreements
constraint the capacity of the firm to reflect idiosyncratic demand shocks into
wage changes. This would be consistent with a corporatist wage setting view of
the labor market, according to which the major role of these institutions would
be to promote a smooth adjustment of wages to another type of shocks, those
at the aggregate level.
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Appendix: Longitudinal linked employer-employee
data set
Checks on the consistency of data
After merging the worker data across years, inconsistencies were identified if
the worker gender or date of birth was reported changing, or if the highest
schooling level achieved was reported decreasing over time. In that case, the
information reported over half the times has been taken as the correct one10
(0.8%, 2.3%, and 5.2% of the observations have been corrected, respectively for
gender, birth date and education). Workers with inconsistent data after the
introduction of the previous corrections were dropped. The whole information
on the worker was dropped, whichever the incorrect number of observations
identified (1.7%, 1.1%, and 4.3% of the observations, respectively for gender,
birth date and schooling). Workers with missing age or schooling after the
introduction of the previous corrections were dropped (respectively 0.7% and
1.7% of the observations, corresponding to 2.1% and 2% of the workers).
Constraints imposed
The analysis focuses on workers and firms in manufacturing and services private
sector in mainland Portugal.
On the worker side, we have retained wage-earners working full-time, aged
18 to 65, whose wage is not below the national minimum wage11 (which led
10Note that this requirement is more demanding than just considering the
modal value as the accurate one.
11May drop apprentices and handicapped workers.
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to dropping 20%, 2%, and 3% of the dataset, respectively). Outliers in wage
growth have been dropped12, which corresponded to a very small share of the
data base, 0.03%. Workers observed just once in the database cannot be con-
sidered in the estimation of the models used (and thus 5% have been dropped).
This is the full set of workers, which comprises over ten million observations.
Due to the large size of the full data set it was not feasible to run the worker
computations on the full data set and we have therefore used a 2 percent random
sample of workers (keeping all the yearly observations for the selected workers).
Descriptive statistics on this sample, comprising 205,352 yearly observations on
42,008 workers, are presented in table A1.13
On the firm side, we have kept firms operating full-year, and whose sales
are not missing or outlier14 (thus dropping 3%, 9%, and 0.2% of the firms,
respectively).15 Firms that were ever larger than 20 workers have been kept for
analysis, since they are more likely to be run in entrepreneurial terms. Given
the very small size structure of the firms in the Portuguese economy, this led
to keeping 12% of the firms. The set of firms under analysis comprises 131,118
yearly observations on 18,368 firms. Descriptive statistics are reported in table
A2.16
12Log difference in real wages either greater than 2 or smaller than -.5
13The dynamics in the models under estimation determine that a smaller num-
ber of individuals will be considered in the regressions.
14Log difference in real wages either greater than 5 or smaller than -5.
15Firms in the first few months of their existence, not yet one year, were ex-
cluded, to avoid capturing sales fluctuations that are due to part-year operation.
16The dynamics in the models under estimation determine that a smaller num-
ber of firms will be considered in the regressions.
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Descriptive statistics
Gross monthly earnings were computed as monthw = bw + sen + reg,where
bw stands for base-wage, sen are seniority-indexed components of pay, and reg
are other regularly paid components. Wages were deflated using the Consumer
Price Index.
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table A1. Descriptive statistics on workers
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Log real monthly wage (PTE) 11.63 0.50
Age 36.20 10.91
Gender (female) 0.39
Education
4 years 0.46
6 years 0.22
9 years 0.13
High School 0.14
University 0.05
Occupation
managers 0.02
professionals 0.02
middle manag, technic. 0.09
administrative 0.15
service, sales 0.11
skilled 0.27
machine operat., assembly 0.14
unskilled 0.15
unknown 0.05
Industry
food, bev, tob. 0.05
textiles 0.17
wood 0.04
chemicals 0.05
mineral products 0.15
construction 0.10
trade 0.21
restaurants, hotels 0.05
transport, communic. 0.04
banking, insurance, business serv. 0.09
other serv. 0.05
Region
North Coast 0.34
Center Coast 0.16
Lisbon 0.40
Inland 0.08
Algarve 0.03
Type of collective bargaining agreement
Decentralized .06
Massive .94
N 205352
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table A2. Descriptive statistics on firms
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Log real sales (1000 PTE) 12.93 1.45
Number workers in firm 58.22 170.80
Number of industries in firm 1.09 0.38
Share firms bankrupt in province 0.09 0.04
Variability firm sales over time: sd log real sales 0.50 0.51
Share of workers earning the minimum wage 0.03 0.11
Industry
food, bev, tob. 0.05
textiles 0.19
wood 0.05
chemicals 0.06
mineral products 0.15
construction 0.11
trade 0.20
restaurants, hotels 0.04
transport, communic. 0.04
banking, insurance, business serv. 0.06
other serv. 0.05
Region
North Coast 0.34
Center Coast 0.18
Lisbon 0.37
Inland 0.08
Algarve 0.03
Origin of capital
national 0.94
foreign 0.06
N 131118
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